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Abstract 
Five studies (N = 361) sought to model a class of errors – namely, those in routine tasks – that 
several literatures have suggested may predispose individuals to higher levels of emotional 
distress. Individual differences in error frequency were assessed in choice reaction time tasks of 
a routine cognitive type. In Study 1, it was found that tendencies toward error in such tasks 
exhibit trait-like stability over time. In Study 3, it was found that tendencies toward error exhibit 
trait-like consistency across different tasks. Higher error frequency, in turn, predicted higher 
levels of negative affect, general distress symptoms, displayed levels of negative emotion during 
an interview, and momentary experiences of negative emotion in daily life (Studies 2-5). In all 
cases, such predictive relations remained significant with individual differences in neuroticism 
controlled. The results thus converge on the idea that error frequency in simple cognitive tasks is 
a significant and consequential predictor of emotional distress in everyday life. The results are 
novel, but discussed within the context of the wider literatures that informed them. 
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A Trait-Like Predictor of Individual Differences in Anxiety and Distress 
 
Early personality theorists, including Allport (1937), Cattell (1950) Eysenck (1947), and 
McClelland (1951), were encompassing in their assessment of personality tendencies. Self-
reported personality traits, particularly toward anxiety, were considered to provide insight into 
individual differences in emotion and behavior. However, behaviors exhibited following 
experimental manipulations (Eysenck), fantasy-based reports of a projective type (McClelland), 
and cognitive processing tendencies (Cattell), were also considered to provide important 
information concerning the individual. This encompassing approach to personality assessment 
has arguably been replaced with a much narrower one defining personality in self-reported terms, 
to the potential cost of the field (Pervin, 1994). 
To be sure, self-reported personality tendencies certainly do predict consequential 
outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martinez, 2006). On the other hand, we suggest here, as elsewhere 
(e.g., Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Neighbors, 2006), that significant insights concerning 
individual difference in emotion can be obtained using implicit cognitive methods as well (also 
see Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002; Schmukle & Egloff, 2005). In this context, the present 
studies pursue the idea that routine cognitive errors should afford significant insights into 
individual differences in anxiety and distress, quite aside from potential relationships involving 
the self-reported trait of neuroticism. 
Broad Theoretical Considerations 
Negative outcomes are the strongest predictor of negative emotions (Frijda, 1992; Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985). Some negative outcomes may be entirely exogenous occurrences, uncaused 
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in any manner by the individual. Included in this category of events are earthquakes, congenital 
childhood diseases, and being in an accident due to the negligence of a drunk driver. Other 
negative outcomes might seem to be of exogenous origin, but not be entirely so. For example, 
although it is undoubtedly true that a relationship breakup is an objective outcome (and thus an 
exogenous event by some definitions), there are good reasons for thinking that individuals 
contribute to such breakups by their own problematic behaviors (Gottman & Driver, 2005; 
Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004). Similarly, a student receiving a poor grade is typically 
responsible for it in some way, though poor instruction or arbitrary grading practices could 
potentially be involved as well (Greenwald, 1997). 
Negative outcomes of a third type are endogenous in origin. Outcomes of this type are 
not due to one’s unlucky fate, but rather are directly due to errors made by the self and the 
negative consequences that follow from them. Included in this category would be yelling at 
relationship partners to the detriment of the relationship (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008), 
engaging in addictive behaviors despite their negative consequences (Wiers & Stacy, 2006), or 
engaging in behaviors that are likely to be generally problematic to successful functioning in 
multiple realms (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004). Baumeister and colleagues (e.g., Baumeister, 
Muraven, & Tice, 2000) have generally suggested that negative outcomes of this self-caused 
type occur to the extent that the self’s resources are depleted, but Robinson, Schmeichel, and 
Inzlicht (in press) made a case for the idea that simpler cognitive failings often underlie more 
molar tendencies toward “self-regulation failure”. In the present studies, we investigate one such 
simpler cognitive mechanism that should differentially predispose individuals to negative 
outcomes of an endogenous type and to negative emotional experiences for this reason. 
Specific Theoretical Considerations 
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On the basis of a careful analysis of consequential errors observed in industrial settings, 
Rasmussen (1986) concluded that such errors were of three types – skill-based, rule-based, or 
knowledge-based. Reason (1990) extended this framework by linking it to cognitive processing 
considerations and to errors commonly exhibited in everyday life. Of most importance to the 
present hypotheses, skill-based errors are those of the most automatic type. Such errors are 
proposed to happen when tasks are mundane, relevant skills are high, and routine processing 
decisions are involved. 
Rasmussen (1986) and Reason (1990) were primarily interested in errors of a normative 
type – i.e., due to momentary conditions rather than individual difference variables. However, 
skill-based errors may be relevant to understanding individual differences as well. Broadbent, 
Cooper, FitzGerald, and Parkes (1982) created a self-report scale seeking to capture individual 
differences in cognitive failures of a routine, automatic type (e.g., “Do you daydream when you 
ought to be listening to something?”). They found that self-reported cognitive failures of this 
routine type were reliable and predicted higher levels self-reported distress. However, a 
subsequent investigation (as well as many others reviewed) concluded that there was little 
evidence for the idea that self-reported cognitive failures predicted the cognitive outcomes that 
they should predict (Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1986). Similar conclusions can be made in 
terms of a more recent literature seeking to link low levels of dispositional mindfulness (e.g., “I 
do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I’m doing”) to relevant cognitive 
performance tendencies (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). 
Generally speaking, self-reported and implicit measures of processing tendencies rarely 
correlate with each other (Asdendopf et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004; Robinson & Neighbors, 
2006). For this reason, it can be hazardous to use any self-report scale to index cognitive 
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processes, particularly to the extent that automatic processing tendencies are posited (Bornstein, 
2001; McClelland, 1987; Robinson & Compton, 2008). Accordingly, we sought to bypass self-
reports of routine cognitive errors by assessing them directly. 
Overview of Studies 
Five studies were conducted. In all of them, cognitive errors were assessed in terms of 
error frequency within basic choice reaction time tasks. In all cases, the tasks were easy, simple, 
and errors were of little consequence to the individual. We did not force fast reactions and thus 
the relevant error rates should be viewed as of an unforced, endogenous type. However, we did 
provide error feedback to insure an investment in being accurate. 
Errors in simple choice reaction time tasks are typically deleted (Robinson, 2007a). 
Perhaps because of this reason, we know of no studies that have sought to examine whether error 
rates in such tasks are stable over time. Study 1 examined this question and we hypothesized that 
individuals would exhibit trait-like levels of stability in their error rates. Study 3 examined a 
related question, namely whether tendencies toward cognitive errors would exhibit some degree 
of consistency across different relatively easy cognitive tasks. We hypothesized at least moderate 
correlations of this type, consistent with a trait-like tendency. 
Studies 2-5 examined whether individuals making more frequent errors in such tasks 
would also be prone to more intense experiences of negative emotion. Diverse assessments of 
negative emotion were obtained in support of this hypothesis. Trait levels of neuroticism were 
assessed in these studies as well. To the extent that our results involve basic cognitive 
tendencies, they may remain significant with levels of trait neuroticism statistically controlled. 
Study 1: Test-Retest Stability 
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Performance-based assessments of the individual have often suffered from low levels of 
reliability in both historical (McClelland, 1987) and modern (Fazio & Olson, 2003) terms. On 
the other hand, it was our intuition that individual differences in routine cognitive errors would 
be reliable, perhaps more so than other performance-based assessments of a cognitive type (for a 
review, see Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). To support this potential point, we conducted an 
initial study examining the test-retest stability of such tendencies to make unforced errors. 
This said, there is no specific task that would be definitive in assessing individual 
difference tendencies toward routine cognitive errors. The Study 1 task, and its blocks and 
stimuli, had been used in previous studies of ours. Further analyses had indicated that all stimuli 
were unambiguous in that they were associated with high normative accuracy rates of 
classification (e.g., Robinson, Goetz, Wilkowski, & Hoffman, 2006). Thus, the Study 1 task 
seemed as good a one as any to start with. Importantly so, though, different choice tasks were 
administered across studies to support more general conclusions. 
Method 
Participants 
 Ninety-three (61 female) undergraduates from the University of Illinois-Champaign 
received extra credit for their participation. 
Individual Differences in Routine Error Frequency 
 Overview. Routine errors were assessed in choice categorization tasks in Study 1 and in 
all subsequent studies as well. Choice tasks of this type are common to the cognitive literature 
(Pashler, 1998) and to our research program on cognitive approaches to personality assessment 
(e.g., Robinson, 2004). Participants were to categorize presented stimuli by responding with one 
of two response keys as accurately and quickly as they could. 
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 Task. We sought to assess individual difference in commission errors in general terms 
rather than those that might be specific to a given choice distinction. A useful assessment 
strategy of this type is to ask individuals to complete multiple choice categorization blocks and 
average performance across them (Robinson & Oishi, 2006). Accordingly, individuals in Study 1 
were asked to categorize presented stimuli across seven distinct consecutive blocks: not animal 
(e.g., chair) versus animal (e.g., mouse) words, unpleasant (e.g., snake) versus pleasant (e.g., 
smile) words, not blame (e.g., worm) versus blame (e.g., crime) words, not threat (e.g., mildew) 
versus threat (e.g., cancer) words, neutral (e.g., coffee) versus pleasant (e.g., flower) words, not 
intense (e.g., quiet) versus intense (e.g., loud) words, and neutral (e.g., basket) versus negative 
(e.g., toilet) words. These stimuli and blocks have been previously validated (e.g., Robinson et 
al., 2006) and there were 408 total trials. 
 In all choice blocks, participants were asked to press the 1 key at the top of the keyboard 
for the first category mentioned above (e.g., chair), but to press the 9 key at the top of the 
keyboard for the second category mentioned above (e.g., mouse). In all blocks, category labels 
were presented toward the left and right of the computer screen to aid in the response-mapping 
process for the particular block. All trials started with a 150 ms blank delay, following which a 
particular stimulus was randomly selected and centrally displayed. Participants were given as 
long as desired to respond to the trial, following which the trial stimulus was removed. To guard 
against trading speed for accuracy, inaccurate responses were penalized with a 1500 ms error 
message. Reaction time data will be reported to evaluate the effectiveness of our cognitive 
assessment in guarding against speed-accuracy tradeoffs. 
Procedures 
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 We sought to show that individual differences in routine cognitive error frequency are 
stable over time. Accordingly, participants completed the choice categorization task described 
above twice, with a one-month interim interval. For both assessments, the categorization task 
was completed in semi-private cubicles, on personal computer, in groups of less than seven. 
Preliminary Considerations 
 The categorization tasks were relatively easy, as should be the case in modeling routine 
errors (Broadbent et al., 1982). Error rates averaged 5.91% at time 1 and 6.38% at time 2. To 
quantify speed for the purpose of assessing possible speed-accuracy tradeoffs, we deleted 
inaccurate trials, log-transformed millisecond scores to reduce skew, and then replaced 2.5 SD 
log-latency outliers with these outlier cutoff scores (Robinson, 2007a). Average speed was then 
calculated across trials. 
Results 
Possible Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff 
 Individuals may commit more errors because they favor speed over accuracy. However, 
we used procedures to guard against such speed-accuracy tradeoffs. Such procedures were 
successful as the correlation between error rates and processing speed was non-significant in the 
present study, both at time 1, r = -.11, p > .20, and at time 2, r = -.01, p > .90. 
Test-Retest Stability 
 Tendencies toward erroneous responding were hypothesized to be stable over time, 
consistent with an individual differences perspective. This proved to be the case as individuals 
who were more prone to making routine cognitive errors at time 1 were also more prone to make 
them at time 2 as well, r = .72, p < .01. 
Discussion 
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 The reliability of cognitive (Robinson, 2007a) and social cognitive (Fazio & Olson, 2003) 
implicit measures is often low. This was not the case for the present implicit cognitive measure, 
which proved to be quite stable over time. For this reason, individual differences in such errors 
may have considerable utility in understanding outcomes thought to result from slips and lapses 
of a routine type (Reason, 1990). 
Study 2: Routine Error Frequency as a Predictor of Negative Emotion 
 Errors are frustrating and costly to goal-pursuit success (Robinson et al., in press) and 
therefore a major hypothesized contributor to negative emotion (Mischel & Ayduk, 2004). For 
this reason, we conducted an initial study seeking to determine whether greater error frequencies 
in a cognitive task would predict higher levels of negative emotion. Broadbent et al. (1982) had 
proposed relationships of this type. Importantly, though, we assess errors objectively and 
therefore can make more definitive conclusions concerning the cognitive nature of this 
relationship. For the sake of discriminant validity, experiences of positive emotion and the trait 
of neuroticism were also assessed. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 54 (43 female) undergraduates from the University of Illinois-
Champaign receiving extra credit. 
Individual Differences in Routine Error Frequency 
 Study 2, like Study 1, used a choice reaction time task to assess tendencies toward routine 
cognitive error. Four consecutive blocks required individuals to categorize presented stimuli 
according the following distinctions: not me (e.g., them) versus me (e.g., me) words, feminine 
(e.g., kind) versus masculine (e.g., strong) words, vegetable (e.g., carrot) versus fruit (e.g., 
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cherry) words, and unpleasant (e.g., jail) versus pleasant (e.g., smile) words. Other details of the 
assessment were identical to Study 1 except that 224 trials were involved. The average rate of 
choice errors was 4.50%. 
Negative and Positive Emotional Experiences 
 Participants were asked to indicate the extent (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = 
extremely) to which they had experienced five markers of negative affect (distressed, hostile, 
irritable, jittery, & nervous; M = 2.11; alpha = .79) during the past week. For purposes of 
discriminant validity, we also assessed experiences of positive affect during the same one-week 
period (determined, enthusiastic, excited, interested, & strong; M = 3.14;  alpha = .76). Such 
markers are a subset of items from the Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) PANAS scales, 
chosen on the basis of item-total correlations (Brown & Marshall, 2001). Levels of positive and 
negative emotion were independent, r = 0. 
Neuroticism 
 Neuroticism was assessed by Goldberg’s (1999) 10-item broad-bandwidth scale, which 
correlates very highly with alternate measures of neuroticism such as that from the NEO-PI 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992; John & Srivastava, 1999). Goldberg’s scale asks individuals to rate the 
extent to which they agree (1 = very inaccurate; 5 = very accurate) that statements reflecting low 
(e.g., seldom feel blue) and high (e.g., worry about things) levels of neuroticism generally 
characterize the self, with the former items reverse-scored (M = 2.93; alpha = .89). 
Procedures 
 Participants completed the measures on a personal computer in groups of 2-6. The 
cognitive task was completed first. Subsequently, participants reported on their trait tendencies 
toward negative and positive affect. Finally, neuroticism was assessed. This order of measures 
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insures that cognitive measures, likely the most malleable, are assessed first and trait measures, 
likely the least malleable, are assessed last (Robinson & Neighbors, 2006). 
Results 
Possible Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff 
 In Study 2, error frequency was a negative predictor of average reaction time, r = -.34, p 
< .05, such that those prone to cognitive errors performed the task more quickly. This result is 
likely anomalous given that there were no relations of this type in Study 1. Regardless, it was 
deemed useful to control for processing speed, which we did in analyses reported below. 
Primary Results 
 As hypothesized, individuals displaying more routine cognitive errors also reported 
higher levels of negative affect, r = .32, p < .05. On the other hand, there was no such 
relationship between routine cognitive errors and positive emotional experiences, r = .06, p > 
.65. Such differential results are likely due to the specific link of problematic occurrences to 
negative rather than positive affective experiences (Watson, 2000). 
 Individuals displaying more routine cognitive errors also completed the categorization 
task more quickly, a result not obtained in other studies. In any case, it seemed desirable to 
control for processing speed in a multiple regression. Error frequency continued to predict 
negative affect with processing speed controlled, t = 2.71, p < .01, Beta = .37. Processing speed 
was a non-significant predictor in this same multiple regression, t = 1.33, p > .15, Beta = .18. 
Thus, greater tendencies toward inaccurate responses predicted higher levels of negative 
emotion, but faster processing speed did not. 
Results Involving Neuroticism 
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 Neuroticism was a non-significant predictor of error frequency, r = .06, p > .65. On the 
other hand, as might be expected, neuroticism was a robust predictor of individual differences in 
negative affect, r = .39, p < .01. Thus, it appears that error frequency and neuroticism 
independently predict negative emotional experiences. This point was confirmed in a multiple 
regression in which it was found that both neuroticism, t = 2.91, p < .01, Beta = .36, and 
tendencies toward routine cognitive error, t = 2.20, p < .05, Beta = .27, were significant 
predictors of negative affect when simultaneously controlled. 
Discussion 
 Skill-based errors have been implicated in genesis of negative affect in the individual 
difference literature on cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982) and, more recently, in the 
literature on mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003). However, attempts to link self-reports of 
cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1986) and mindfulness (Brown et al., 2007) to relevant 
cognitive tendencies have rarely yielded dividends. Accordingly, we sought to bypass self-
reported tendencies toward routine cognitive errors, instead defining them in objective terms that 
would seem more conducive to their assessment (Pashler, 1998; Reason, 1990). 
Consistent with hypotheses, we found that individuals prone to make erroneous 
categorizations in a cognitive task were also those prone to negative emotional experiences. This 
relationship makes intuitive sense because error-prone processing should predict problematic 
outcomes in everyday life, in turn predicting the negative sorts of reactions that result from them 
(Frijda, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, the present results are entirely 
novel to the cognition-emotion literature and noteworthy for this reason. 
 Of further importance, discriminant validity was established in three ways. When 
controlling for processing speed, individual differences in routine cognitive errors continued to 
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predict negative emotional experiences. Results cannot therefore be ascribed to speed-accuracy 
tradeoffs likely to differ between individuals. In addition, we were able to support the point that 
tendencies toward routine cognitive errors predicted negative emotional experience, but not 
positive emotional experiences, consistent with Watson’s (2000) general analysis. Finally, the 
error-negative affect relation remained significant with trait levels of neuroticism controlled. 
We hasten to add, in the latter connection, that neuroticism was a significant predictor of 
negative emotional experiences as well. Thus, our findings in no way dispute the robust tendency 
for the trait of neuroticism to predict negative emotions and symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1999). 
Rather, they suggest that cognitive assessments of the individual are likely to have considerable 
explanatory value and predictive validity quite independent of people’s conscious (i.e., self-
reported) views of themselves (Robinson & Compton, 2008). 
Study 3: Replication and Extensions 
 In comparison to Studies 1 and 2, the cognitive task used in Study 3 was even more basic 
in nature, involving a color-word Stroop task (MacLeod, 1991). We hypothesized that individual 
differences in error frequency in the task would predict higher levels of negative emotion, as in 
Study 2. In contrast to Study 2, though, a full set of PANAS markers (Watson et al., 1988) was 
used. As in Study 2, we also assessed trait levels of neuroticism as well. 
 We suggest that routine cognitive errors constitute a trait-like tendency that varies 
between individuals. Study 1 supported one classic criterion of a trait-like tendency in that 
routine cognitive errors were very stable over time. Study 3 sought to examine the other classic 
criterion of a trait-like tendency, namely consistency across different assessment contexts or 
stimulus conditions (Diener & Larsen, 1984). Toward this end, we assessed routine cognitive 
errors in three cognitive tasks, each varying somewhat dramatically in the stimuli, procedures, 
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and response requirements involved (see below). If there is a trait-like tendency toward routine 
cognitive errors, we would expect at least moderate correlations of error frequency across the 
three tasks. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 41 (38 female) participants from the University of Illinois-Champaign 
who received extra credit. 
Individual Differences in Routine Error Frequency 
The primary assessment of routine error frequency was a choice task, as in Studies 1 and 
2. However, for purposes of replication, it was deemed useful to use a more basic choice task 
than that previously used. Toward this end, a color-word Stroop task was used. In it, there were 
six stimuli involved, which crossed three letter strings (“green”, “red”, & “xxx”) with two font 
colors (green versus red). If the letter string was green (red), participants were to respond with 
the 1 (9) keys at the top of the keyboard. Stimuli were randomly selected for individual trials, 
presented at center screen, and there were 252 trials in total. Correct responses were followed by 
a 500 ms blank delay, whereas incorrect responses received a 2000 ms visual error message. The 
average error rate was 3.51%. Response speed was scored as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Commission Errors in a Cueing Task 
 In addition to the primary assessment task, a version of Posner’s (1980) cueing task was 
also administered. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as a white X was 
presented. We informed participants that the vast majority of trials would present such a white X 
stimulus, but that a minority of trials would not present such a target. For the latter set of trials 
(60 of 240), participants were instructed to refrain from responding. It is especially easy to 
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refrain from responding on such “catch” trials. Indeed, error rates for such trials were quite low 
(M = 1.67%). Nevertheless, we predicted that tendencies toward routine cognitive errors in the 
primary task would predict higher rates of responding to such “catch” trials. In the language of 
Reason (1990), higher error rates in this task would constitute action slips – i.e., responding 
when one should not do so. 
Errors Exhibited in a Sustained Attention Task 
 A sustained attention task was also administered. In this 8-minute task, consecutive single 
digit stimuli were presented for 300, 300, and 600 ms, respectively. If all three consecutive 
stimuli were odd, or all were even, participants were instructed to press the spacebar. For other 
trials in which there was a mix of odd and even digits, participants were instructed to refrain 
from pressing the spacebar. The task strained abilities to sustain attention, particularly so because 
only 40 of the 240 trials required pressing the spacebar and no accuracy feedback was provided. 
Tendencies toward error in this task are of both commission and omission types and therefore an 
overall error rate score was computed, separately so for each participant (M = 14.18%). In the 
language of Reason (1990), higher error rates in this task would primarily constitute lapses of 
attention – i.e., failing to respond when one should do so. 
Negative Affect and Neuroticism 
 Individual differences in positive and negative emotions were assessed by the 20 markers 
of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). Specifically, participants reported on the extent (1 = very 
slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely) to which they had experienced ten negative emotions (e.g., 
afraid, upset; M = 2.15;  alpha = .87) and ten positive emotions (e.g., active, proud; M = 3.44; 
alpha = .91) during the last month. The positive and negative emotion scales were not 
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significantly correlated, r = -.19, p > .20. Neuroticism was assessed by the same Goldberg (1999) 
scale also used in Study 2 (M = 2.77;  alpha = .89). 
Procedures 
 A constant order of assessments was used to facilitate individual difference comparisons. 
The cueing task was administered first, the Stroop task was administered next, and the sustained 
attention task was the final cognitive task administered. Subsequent to the cognitive tasks, 
participants reported on their experiences of negative and positive emotion over the last month, 
following which they completed the neuroticism scale. All responses were made on personal 
computers in private cubicles in group sizes of less than 7. 
Results 
Possible Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff 
 The correlation between error frequency and response speed in the Stroop task was non-
significant, r = -.24, p > .10. Thus, there was no speed-accuracy tradeoff in the primary task. 
Routine Errors as a Predictor of Negative Affect 
 Individuals who made more errors on the Stroop task experienced more intense 
experiences of negative emotion, relative to low-error individuals, r = .45, p < .01. On the other 
hand, the frequency of routine cognitive errors did not predict positive affect, r = .14, p > .35. 
Such results are consistent with those of Study 2. Also consistent with Study 2, higher levels of 
neuroticism predicted higher levels of negative affect, r = .59, p < .01. 
 There was a marginal relation between neuroticism and the frequency of routine 
cognitive errors, r = .32, p > .05. No such relation had been observed in Study 2 and we therefore 
believe it to be sample-dependent. In any case, was deemed useful to conduct a multiple 
regression in which negative emotional experiences were predicted on the basis of error 
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frequency and neuroticism, both predictors simultaneously controlled. Controlling for their 
overlapping variance, we found that both neuroticism, t = 3.76, p < .01, Beta = .50, and error-
proneness, t = 2.19, p < .05, Beta = .29, were independent predictors. Thus, we were again able 
to show that individual differences in routine cognitive error frequency predict negative (but not 
positive) emotional experiences independent of trait levels of neuroticism. 
Results Involving the Other Cognitive Measures 
 The three cognitive tasks were quite different in their requirements (e.g., only the Stroop 
task required individuals to respond on all trials). If individual differences in routine cognitive 
error are reliable, however, error frequencies for the three tasks should be positively correlated. 
This proved to be the case as the primary error measure, from the Stroop task, positively 
predicted error rates in the sustained attention, r = .45, p < .01, and Posner cueing, r = .49, p < 
.01, tasks as well. It was also the case that individuals who made more errors in the sustained 
attention task made more errors on the catch trials of the Posner cueing task, r = .45, p < .01. 
Thus, these results indicate that individuals are prone to routine cognitive errors (or not so prone) 
irrespective of the particular task involved. 
We next examined whether error frequencies in the vigilance and cueing tasks would 
predict individual differences in negative emotional experience as well. The correlation 
involving error rates in the vigilance task was in the predicted direction, but it was not 
significant, r = .23, p < .20. On the other hand, error frequencies in the Posner cueing task did 
predict more intense experiences of negative emotion, r = .46, p < .01, and this remained the case 
when controlling for levels of neuroticism in a multiple regression, t = 2.65, p < .05, Beta = .33. 
Discussion 
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We do not contend that the three tasks administered in Study 3 exhaust the universe of 
tasks that could be used to assess routine cognitive errors. However, the tasks administered do 
appear to assess very different types of routine cognitive error. For this reason, to the extent that 
error frequencies predict each other across the tasks, novel support for the second criterion of a 
trait-related tendency – namely, consistency across different situations or contexts – would be 
supported. Evidence supported the idea that routine cognitive errors can be considered 
characteristic of individuals across quite different tasks. We hasten to add that these results 
support the cross-task consistency of routine cognitive errors, but that other tasks would be 
necessary to assess whether inter-individual consistency can be observed with reference to rule- 
or knowledge-based errors of the sort detailed by Reason (1990). 
Of additional importance, the results of Study 3 replicated those of Study 2 in supporting 
the idea that proneness to errors in relatively simple tasks is related to negative affect in a robust 
manner. Specifically, it was again found that higher levels of routine cognitive error predicted 
higher levels of negative emotional experiences as well. The two cognitive tasks that best 
predicted such experiences were those that required a high rate of responding. We therefore 
suggest that skill-based slips of action, rather than skill-based lapses of attention, appear to be a 
more potent predictor of negative emotional experiences. This idea would seem to fit with the 
mindfulness literature, which often defines mindless processing in terms of action slips (Brown 
et al., 2007). Further studies of the present type, however, would be useful in contrasting action 
slips versus attention lapses as predictors of distress-related outcomes. 
Study 4: General Distress Symptoms and Displays of Negative Emotion 
 Studies 2 and 3 examined relations between routine cognitive errors and relatively 
common experiences of negative emotion (e.g., irritation). A purpose of Study 4 was to extend 
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this analysis to general distress symptoms of potentially greater clinical significance, albeit in 
dimensional rather than diagnostic terms. Accordingly, we asked individuals in Study 4 to report 
on their recent distress-related experiences of depression (e.g., felt depressed) and anxiety (e.g., 
felt anxious) using relevant general distress scales from the MASQ (Watson & Clark, 1991). We 
hypothesized that routine cognitive errors would positively predict both such sets of symptoms. 
 Individuals are in a unique position to understand their own negative emotional 
experiences and symptoms (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross 2007). However, it is also of 
interest to examine whether those with tendencies toward routine cognitive error also exhibit 
signs of distress that can be observed by others (Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993). To examine 
this question, we conducted a “mental health” interview of the sort used by Spalding and Hardin 
(1999), following which the interviewer rated the extent to which distress-related negative affect 
was displayed during the interview. A significant conceptual replication would occur to the 
extent that individuals making more routine cognitive errors are rated as more distressed by 
experimenters immediately following the one-on-one interview of Study 4. 
 Studies 2 and 3 examined relationships between routine cognitive error frequency and 
negative affect in single-session assessment protocols. Although there is no reason to think that 
the negative affect measures assessed in these studies can be biased by state-related experiences 
of distress (Watson, 2000), it still seemed desirable to use a different type of assessment protocol 
in Study 4. Accordingly, the frequency of routine cognitive errors was assessed in one session, 
general distress symptoms were assessed in a second, and the interview was conducted in a third 
session, with at least one week separating sessions. To the extent that routine cognitive errors 
predict experiences and displays of distress in Study 4, then, results could not be ascribed to 
momentary states and their influence on both sorts of variables. 
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Method 
Participants and Individual Differences in Routine Error Frequency 
 Participants were 68 (51 female) undergraduates from North Dakota State University 
who received extra credit. Individual differences in routine error frequency were assessed using 
the same color-word Stroop task also administered in Study 3. The average error frequency rate 
in Study 4 was 3.36%. Response speed was scored as above. 
General Distress Symptoms and Neuroticism 
 The MASQ (Watson & Clark, 1991) includes two subscales to measure general distress 
symptoms and both of them were administered here. For both subscales, participants were asked 
to indicate the extent (1 = very slightly or not at all; 5 = extremely) to which they had 
experienced each of the relevant symptoms during the past week. The general distress anxiety 
subscale assesses symptoms thought to be more characteristic of anxiety-related disorders (e.g., 
felt nervous; here, M = 1.62;  alpha = .92), whereas the general distress depression subscale 
assesses symptoms thought to be more characteristic of depression related disorders (e.g., felt 
depressed: here, M = 1.66;  alpha = .90). Neuroticism was assessed by the same Goldberg (1999) 
scale also used in prior studies (here, M = 2.33; alpha = .91). 
Displayed Negative Affect 
 We conducted an ostensible “mental health” interview to elicit behaviors characteristic of 
anxiety and negative affect (Robinson & Cervone, 2006; Shedler et al., 1993). Our interview was 
closely modeled after procedures reported by Spalding and Hardin (1999). Participants were 
asked a series of nine questions and asked to provide 2-3 sentence answers to each of them. 
Three of the questions were relatively neutral (e.g., describe a time in the past year that you saw 
a movie), whereas the remaining six of the nine questions were designed to provoke negative 
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affect (e.g., describe a time in the past year when you felt nervous). Thus, on balance, questions 
probed areas associated with potential distress for the individual. 
 Such interviews were conducted by a single experimenter with a single participant and 
lasted 5-10 minutes. Immediately following each interview, the experimenter rated the extent (1 
= not at all; 7 = extremely) to which the participant had displayed behaviors consistent with four 
distress-related feelings (anxious, distressed, nervous, & tense). To assess molar tendencies to 
display negative emotions, items were averaged (M = 2.84; alpha = .76). 
Procedures 
 One purpose of Study 4 was to examine whether tendencies toward routine cognitive 
error predict subsequent experiences and displays of negative emotion. Accordingly, the study 
involved three assessment sessions. In the first, error frequency was assessed in a color-word 
Stroop task. Approximately two weeks later, participants returned to complete the general 
distress and neuroticism questionnaires, in that order. Approximately one week after the second 
session, they returned for the interview. The first two sessions involved small groups of 2-6, 
whereas the interview was conducted with one participant at a time. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Individuals making more frequent cognitive errors were not faster overall, ruling out 
speed-accuracy considerations, r = .04, p > .75. On the other hand, as might be expected, 
neuroticism was positively predictive of general distress symptoms, both of an anxious, r = .54, p 
< .01, and depressive, r = .45, p < .01, type. Interestingly though, neuroticism did not predict 
displayed negative emotion during the interview, r = .02, p > .85. The latter result is not 
unexpected on the basis of prior findings linking displays of emotion, particularly in an interview 
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setting, to implicit and non-conscious factors (Asendorpf et al., 2002; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001; Shedler et al., 1993; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). Finally, neuroticism did not predict the 
frequency with which routine cognitive errors were made, r = .12, p > .30. 
Primary Analyses 
 We hypothesized that individuals exhibiting more frequent errors in the Stroop task 
would be prone to general distress symptoms and experiences as well. This proved to be the case 
for both general distress anxiety symptoms, r = .25, p < .05, and general distress depression 
symptoms, r = .31, p < .01. We also hypothesized that routine cognitive errors would predict 
greater displays of upset and distress during a distress-eliciting interview. This hypothesis was 
also supported, r = .31, p < .05. 
 Neuroticism was a strong predictor of two of the three Study 4 outcomes. Multiple 
regressions were therefore performed in which both neuroticism and the implicit cognitive 
measure were simultaneous regressed. In predicting general distress symptoms of anxiety type, 
both error frequency, t = 3.21, p < .01, Beta = .32, and neuroticism, t = 5.73, p < .01, Beta = .57, 
were significant predictors. In predicting general distress symptoms of a depression type, it was 
also the case that both error frequency, t = 3.79, p < .01, Beta = .38, and neuroticism, t = 5.26, p 
< .01, Beta = .52, were significant predictors. In predicting displays of negative emotion during 
an interview, though, error frequency, t = 2.67, p < .01, Beta = .32, but not neuroticism, t = 0.51, 
p > .60, Beta = .06, was a significant predictor. In sum, Study 4 replicated prior results, but 
extended them to general distress symptoms of potential clinical significance and to behavioral 
manifestations of distress apparent to an interviewer. 
Discussion 
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 Study 4 was the first to assess routine error frequency and distress-related outcomes with 
at least a week-long delay between such assessments. Because individual differences in error 
frequency continued to predict negative emotional outcomes in the context of such a temporal 
delay, the results cannot be viewed in terms of state-dependent processes of the sort that would 
last minutes, hours, or even days. Such results therefore further attest to the dispositional 
vulnerabilities that appear characteristic of individuals with tendencies toward routine errors. 
 Second, the MASQ general distress scales administered in Study 4 have been shown to 
possess clinical significance (Watson & Clark, 1991). In more particular terms, such symptoms 
capture a common core to the anxiety and mood disorders and may be best viewed in terms of 
the DSM-IV diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994). Our 
findings are intuitive along such lines because theories of this disorder emphasize tendencies – 
whether rumination, worry, or avoidance – whose common element appears to be of some degree 
of inattention to the current stimulus context (Borkovec & Sharpless, 2004). We suggest that a 
cognitive probe of skill-based errors (Reason, 1990) may have value to this literature, while 
recognizing that studies of a clinical type would be useful in further substantiating our individual 
difference model of distress-proneness. 
Third, we were able to show that individuals making more frequent routine cognitive 
errors also exhibited higher levels of behavioral distress during a purported mental health 
interview. Thus, this probe of distress-proneness appears to possess explanatory value in relation 
to outcomes beyond those that are self-reported in nature. We do recognize that further studies of 
this type appear warranted. For example, would the reports of knowledgeable informants – i.e., 
friends or acquaintances – replicate the observer-based findings of Study 4? If so, relevant 
extensions of these findings would have considerable value in understanding interpersonal 
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reactions and functioning of an anxiety-related type (Robinson, Meier, Wilkowski, & Ode, 
2007). This theme is revisited in the General Discussion. 
Study 5: Predicting Negative Emotion in Everyday Life 
 The results of Studies 2-4 have been robust in linking individual differences in routine 
cognitive errors to negative affect and other indications of distress. However, emotional 
experiences and symptoms were examined by asking individuals to characterize their occurrence 
over the recent week or month. It would therefore seem useful to conduct an experience-
sampling study to confirm this relationship in relatively more momentary terms. We accordingly 
performed a fifth study in which emotional experiences were assessed at randomized times by 
the use of hand-held computer recording devices. As the intensity and duration of momentary 
affective experiences are potentially separable (Schimmack, Oishi, Diener, & Suh, 2000), 
participants were asked to report on both. 
There are several benefits to experience-sampling protocols that we should emphasize. 
First, they capture emotions as they occur in one’s ecological context (Bolger, Davis, & Rafaeli, 
2003). Second, by the use of randomized prompts, one ensures that collected data characterize 
representative moments of experience (Fleeson, 2007). Third, by averaging multiple momentary 
reports, the aggregated averages should be particularly useful in characterizing personality 
tendencies irrespective of transitory situational influences (Epstein, 1983). Fourth, protocols of 
this type minimize biases that sometimes occur when people retrospectively characterize their 
feelings (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999; Robinson & Clore, 2002). Thus, to the extent that error-
proneness predicts negative emotional experiences in Study 5, the results would constitute a 
substantial conceptual replication of the findings reported in Studies 2-4. 
Method 
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Participants and Neuroticism Assessment 
 Participants were 105 (63 female) undergraduates from University of Illinois-Champaign. 
They received credit for an upper-division psychology class for their participation. Neuroticism 
was assessed in the same manner as in prior studies (M = 2.83; alpha = .83). 
Individual Differences in Routine Error Frequency 
 Individual differences in routine error frequency were assessed in a manner similar to 
Studies 1 and 2, though more extensively so. Nine consecutive choice categorization blocks were 
used: not me (e.g., them) versus me (e.g., me) words, unpleasant (e.g., liar) versus pleasant (e.g., 
life) words, not animal (e.g., stick) versus animal (e.g., mouse) words, not blame (e.g., landslide) 
versus blame (e.g., addiction) words, not threat (e.g., stench) versus threat (e.g., snake) words, 
neutral (e.g., chance) versus positive (e.g., charm) words, neutral (e.g., method) versus negative 
(e.g., misery) words, feminine (e.g., tender) versus masculine (e.g., forceful) words, and not 
intense (e.g., quiet) versus intense (e.g., loud) words. There were a total of 412 trials. As in prior 
studies, participants received an error message (here, 1500 ms) if they were incorrect and there 
was a short blank delay (here, 150 ms) between consecutive trials within a block. The average 
error frequency was 6.31%. 
Experience-Sampling Protocol 
 Participants completed a one-week experience-sampling protocol. Emotional experiences 
were assessed in everyday life through the use of palmtop computers. During each of the seven 
days involved, participants received six randomized pages throughout the course of the day and 
had 15 minutes to respond to each. To accommodate different waking-sleeping schedules, such 
pages only occurred between the hours of 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. Individuals completing less than 
half of the reports were removed and this resulted in a sample size of 105. 
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 When paged, a first set of questions pertained to the intensity of momentary experiences 
of emotion. Specifically, participants were asked to report the extent (0 = not at all; 7 = 
extremely) to which they were currently experiencing four positive (calm, excited, happy, & 
pleasant; M = 2.61; alpha = .85) and four negative (irritated, sad, tense, & unpleasant; M = 0.88; 
alpha = .86) emotion markers. Subsequent to reporting on the intensity of their momentary 
experiences, a second set of questions asked individuals to report on the percentage of time 
during the previous hour that they felt each of the same eight emotion markers, a duration-based 
measure (1 = 0% of the time; 7 = 100% of the time). Duration-based estimates for positive (M = 
3.68; alpha = .75) and negative (M = 1.10; alpha = .86) were reliable as well. 
Procedures 
 As in Study 4, assessments of the individual difference variables were made at different 
points in time. The trait of neuroticism was assessed early on in the semester. At mid-semester, 
the cognitive task was administered. At least two weeks subsequent to assessing individual 
differences in routine cognitive error frequency, participants completed the experience-sampling 
protocol. Laboratory assessments of neuroticism and cognitive performance were completed in 
small groups at private cubicles. The experience-sampling protocol was completed over four 
successive weeks and involved pre-programmed palmtop computers. 
Results 
Preliminary Results 
 Higher tendencies toward cognitive error were independent of processing speed, r = -.03, 
p > .70. Across studies, then, error-proneness in the tasks administered cannot be ascribed to 
trading speed for accuracy. Study 5 was the first study in which neuroticism predicted higher 
levels of error frequency during the cognitive task, r = .20, p < .05. Neuroticism was also a 
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significant or marginal predictor of all of the experience-sampled emotion measures: negative 
emotional intensity, r = .29, p < .01; positive emotional intensity, r = -.25, p < .05; negative 
emotional duration, r = .36, p < .01; and positive emotional duration, r = -.19, p < .10. Such 
results comport with suggestions that neuroticism is a robust positive predictor of negative 
emotional experiences, and often an inverse predictor of positive emotional experiences, in daily 
life (Suls & Martin, 2005). 
Primary Results 
 As hypothesized, higher levels of routine error frequency predicted more intense negative 
emotional states in momentary terms, r = .23, p < .05, and such states were longer-lasting as 
well, r = .21, p < .05. Error frequency, though, did not predict the intensity of positive emotional 
experiences, r = -.13, p > .15, but did predict positive emotional experiences that were shorter in 
duration, r = -.25, p < .01. The last result is interesting, but would have to be replicated to gain 
further confidence in it, particularly given the intensity-related results from this study and the 
results from Studies 2 and 3 as well. Thus, the general conclusion is that errors of a routine type, 
termed skill-based errors by Reason (1990), appears to be a stronger and robust predictor of 
negative emotional states relative to positive emotional states. 
Multiple regressions were performed to understand the respective roles of the implicit 
error frequency measure and neuroticism in predicting the Study 5 outcomes. In a multiple 
regression predicting the intensity of negative experiences, both the cognitive measure, t = 2.89, 
p < .01, Beta = .28, and neuroticism, t = 2.43, p < .05, Beta = .24, were independent predictors. 
This was also true in a multiple regression predicting the duration of negative experiences, as 
both the error frequency measure, t = 2.45, p < .05, Beta = .23, and neuroticism, t = 3.27, p < .01, 
Beta = .31, were again independent predictors. Neuroticism was a unique predictor of positive 
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emotional intensity, t = -2.29, p < .05, Beta = -.23, whereas both the error frequency, t = -2.89, p 
< .01, Beta = -.28, and neuroticism measures, t = -2.43, p < .05, Beta = -.24, were inverse 
predictors of the duration of positive emotional experiences. 
Discussion 
 Study 5 was important because we were able to show that individuals making more 
frequent errors of a routine type were also more vulnerable to more intense and longer-lasting 
negative emotional experiences in their daily lives. Results from this study, then, are perhaps the 
strongest in supporting the idea that routine cognitive errors can be considered a risk factor of 
anxiety and distress of a consequential and hitherto unappreciated and undocumented type. The 
consistency of the results across studies, furthermore, provides additional support for viewing 
error-proneness as an implicit vulnerability marker of negative emotional vulnerability. 
General Discussion 
Overview of Theoretical Considerations and Findings 
 The personality literature has shown that trait self-reports of negative emotion predict 
state self-reports of negative emotion so much so that it useful to consider them as alternative 
measures of the same thing – namely, negative emotionality (Clark & Watson, 1999; Meyer & 
Shack, 1989). No one disputes that neuroticism is a strong predictor of negative emotional 
experiences and in fact similar results were observed in the present studies. However, to the 
extent that neuroticism and negative emotional experiences are equated, a definitional problem 
occurs (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). As stated by Gross, Sutton, and Ketelaar (1998), there is a 
danger of tautology here, namely that that tendencies toward negative emotion predict tendencies 
toward negative emotion much as X should predict X according to any logical system. 
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Thus, to the extent that one seeks to understand why it is that certain individuals 
experience more intense and frequent negative emotional experiences, it would be useful to 
examine the processing mechanisms involved, potentially independent of trait-related 
considerations (Cervone, 2004). Drawing from previous literatures (e.g., Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003; Fetterman, Robinson, Ode, & Gordon, 2010; Reason, 1990), we sought to 
examine whether individual differences in routine cognitive errors can be viewed in terms of a 
trait-like vulnerability marker. Three general considerations guided our investigation. 
First, if routine cognitive errors render some individuals generally prone to negative 
emotional experiences, then routine cognitive errors should exhibit trait-like properties, most 
prominently in terms of consistency over time and across different stimulus conditions or 
contexts (Mischel, 1968). In support of this trait-like property, Study 1 established that the extent 
to which individuals made routine cognitive errors were highly consistent across time. Further, 
Study 3 found that routine cognitive errors displayed trait-like consistency across different 
stimulus contexts, procedures, and cognitive tasks. Accordingly, we suggest that routine 
cognitive errors in cognitive tasks appear to possess trait-like consistency. 
 Second, to the extent that routine cognitive errors represent a trait-like vulnerability to 
negative emotional experiences, this case would be strengthened by a body of conceptual 
replication efforts and findings. Study 2 found that routine cognitive errors predicted negative 
emotional experiences over the previous week time frame. Study 3 replicated and extended such 
results to a consideration of negative emotional experiences characteristic over the previous 
month. Study 4 found that routine cognitive errors predicted general distress experiences of both 
anxiety- and depression-related types. Study 4 further found that individuals exhibiting greater 
error frequency in a cognitive task displayed higher levels of negative emotion during a 
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purported mental health interview. Study 5, finally, provided support for what we regard as the 
ultimate criterion to be predicted – namely, emotional experiences occurring in everyday life. As 
hypothesized, higher levels of cognitive error predicted more intense and frequent negative 
emotional states in everyday life in the experience-sampling protocol of Study 5. 
 Third, it is a point of fact that the trait of neuroticism is a moderate to strong predictor of 
negative emotional states and symptoms (Clark & Watson, 1999; Meyer & Shack, 1989). Thus, 
support for a novel dispositional predictor of such states and symptoms would be supported to 
the extent to which discriminant validity can be demonstrated in relation to this trait. Studies 2-5 
assessed both tendencies toward routine cognitive errors and self-reported individual differences 
in neuroticism. By examining correlations among these variables and their respective roles in 
predicting the outcome variables, we were able to show that our implicit predictor of 
dispositional vulnerability was generally not correlated with the self-reported trait of 
neuroticism, but was predictive of negative emotional experiences nonetheless, even controlling 
of individual differences in this trait. 
Thus, the results converge on a unique implicit predictor of dispositional tendencies 
toward negative emotional states. At the same time, there are a number of unexamined questions 
that would benefit from further investigation. The General Discussion focuses on what we have 
learned as a result of the present findings and what further investigations and studies can be 
advocated on the basis of the present findings. 
Routine Cognitive Errors 
 Prior to the present studies, individual differences in their tendencies toward routine 
errors had been assessed almost exclusively by self-report (Broadbent et al., 1982). However, 
such self-reports have been shown to be poor predictors of individual differences in performance 
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within relevant cognitive tasks (Broadbent et al., 1986). The present assessment approach 
bypasses self-report entirely by assessing routine error frequencies in implicit processing terms. 
Errors in information processing can occur when individuals are asked to respond faster 
than desired, leading them to trade speed for accuracy (e.g., Greenwald, Klinger, & Schuh, 
1995). However, our tasks were not of this type in that the tasks did not encourage responding 
faster than might be desired. Although errors were unforced, it is possible that individuals 
differed in the extent to which they favored speedy responding over accurate responding (e.g., 
Dickman & Meyer, 1988). Such speed-accuracy tradeoffs were not evident in our studies. 
Individuals who made more cognitive errors were not generally faster in their performance 
across studies. Furthermore, in the one study in which such a speed-accuracy tradeoff may have 
occurred (Study 2), error frequencies continued to predict negative affect with processing speed 
statistically controlled. Thus, the present findings should be viewed in terms of individual 
differences in error frequency rather than motives favoring speedier responding. 
The success of the present predictions and findings follows from the straightforward idea 
that individuals who make more routine cognitive errors are also likely to be prone to mindless 
errors in daily life. Cognitive failures are rare in daily life, though (Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Reason, 1990), which is why we examined outcomes – such as general distress symptoms and 
momentary experiences of negative emotion – that would presumably track such errors over time 
(Frijda, 1992; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). However, daily experience-sampling 
protocols might prove sensitive to everyday cognitive failures (Ode, Hilmert, Zielke, & 
Robinson, in press). If so, it would seem useful to provide more direct evidence for the idea that 
routine cognitive failures predict daily outcomes of an error-related type (e.g., eating without 
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thinking, forgetting names, and so forth). We do acknowledge that evidence of this type seems 
important in understanding the cognitive tendencies assessed. 
Broader Theoretical Considerations 
 We were able to provide robust support for the idea that individuals who make routine or 
skill-based (Reason, 1990) errors are at risk for a variety of negative emotional experiences. We 
suggest that this is because some individuals withdraw controlled processing resources in the 
context of routine tasks – i.e., those in which it seems that automatic processing routines may 
seem to suffice. We note that this view of controlled processing resources and their use has a 
considerable recent precedent. For example, Lieberman (2003) suggested that stereotypes in 
person perception typically occur not because of limits on controlled processing, but rather 
because certain individuals disengage the cognitive machinery used to individuate persons when 
they deem automatic modes of responding sufficient (also Fiske, 1993). In understanding 
individual differences in anger and reactive aggression, we have similarly concluded that 
capacities related to control are seldom involved (Wilkowski & Robinson, 2008). Rather, angry 
individuals simply “let down their guard” when the performance context seems to favor 
automatic modes of responding (for relevant data, see Wilkowski & Robinson, 2007; for a more 
general analysis, see Robinson et al., in press). 
 Translated to the present, the routine cognitive tasks administered would be precisely 
those in which some individuals would presume their automatic processing routines to be 
sufficiently working, whereas others would not (Robinson et al., in press). Unfortunately for the 
former individuals, error-monitoring processes are often essential to performance in even quite 
routine tasks such as those administered – perhaps not all the time, but at least on a minority of 
trials (Kerns, Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman 
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& Shallice, 1986). In turn, letting down one’s guard under such circumstances should precipitate 
and cause a higher rate of mindless behavioral errors in everyday life (Broadbent et al., 1982; 
Brown et al., 2007). It is this reason, we suggest, that routine cognitive errors were so successful 
in predicting individual differences in distress in daily life. 
The question of whether anxiety states cause cognitive failures or action slips is an old 
one (e.g., H. Eysenck, 1947), but it now seems safe to say that this alternative direction of 
influence is implausible on the basis of available data. For example, M. Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, and Calvo (2007) reviewed several sources of data indicating that anxiety does not 
undermine cognitive performance, but rather reduces its efficiency (also see Sarason, Sarason, & 
Pierce, 1990; and several studies from our lab: e.g., Robinson, 2007b; Robinson, Moeller, & 
Fetterman, in press). Thus, the most plausible direction of influence involved in the present 
findings is one in which greater error frequency predicts problematic outcomes in daily life 
rather than vice versa, though perhaps further studies of the present type would be valuable. 
 To what extent can the present findings be interpreted in terms of general intelligence? 
Although further data appear necessary, intelligence is assessed in conditions in which maximal 
rather than typical or routine performance is measured (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2006). By 
contrast, the present studies assess performance accuracy in somewhat minimal processing 
conditions that do not require retrieving extensive sources of knowledge or manipulating 
information in a highly controlled manner. To what extent can the present findings be interpreted 
in terms of working memory processes? Working memory processes are similarly those that are 
assessed under conditions of load and over protracted periods of time (Engle, 2002). Further, 
cognitive sources of data from this literature have shown that individual differences in working 
memory capacity do not predict performance in automatic processing tasks or conditions, but 
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rather only predict performance in conditions in which controlled processing resources must 
necessarily be recruited for successful performance (Engle & Kane, 2004). Hence, we suggest 
that the present results can be viewed in terms of minimal rather than maximal contributions to 
performance. 
 In retrospect, though, it would have been desirable to assess both routine cognitive errors 
and measures tapping maximal performance abilities. If we are correct, such maximal ability 
measures (e.g., intelligence) should correlate only weakly with routine cognitive errors, much as 
cognitive failures of a self-reported type have been shown to be largely independent of such 
ability measures (Broadbent et al., 1982) and those related to executive attention processes 
(Broadbent et al., 1986). Moreover, the mindfulness literature makes a similar point: Lapses of 
attention of a minimal rather than maximal type have significant value in predicting individual 
differences in distress and problematic functioning, potentially independent of the ability-related 
capacities of the individual (Brown et al., 2007). Nevertheless, we recognize that further research 
is necessary to clarify relations between routine cognitive errors and such ability measures. 
 Motivational processes are thought to be important to performance, though the 
motivation-performance interface has proven especially tricky in cognitive-behavioral paradigms 
of the present type (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Sanders, 1998). Regardless, the present 
cognitive-behavioral measure – error frequency in routine cognitive tasks – was a novel one and 
it is useful to consider such questions of task motivation. We suggest that all individuals should 
have been sufficiently task-motivated for two reasons. Error rates were normatively low, thus 
indicating that all individuals likely sought to respond in an accurate manner. If they had not, 
furthermore, they would have encountered substantial error penalties. Hence, even individuals 
seeking to complete the experimental tasks as fast as possible should have been motivated to 
Routine Cognitive Errors 36 
avoid such substantial error penalties. Instead, and as mentioned above, we contend that high-
error individuals operate under the assumption that their automatic processing routines are 
sufficient in such a cognitive-behavioral performance context and thus omit checks on accurate 
responding that low-error individuals do not. 
Future Research Directions 
It would seem important to extend the present findings. For example, routine cognitive 
error frequencies should predict informant reports of negative emotion, a result that would 
complement Study 4’s link to experimenter ratings of distress. It would also seem useful to 
investigate results examining whether routine cognitive error tendencies may be of use in 
predicting changes in anxiety and depression symptoms over time. 
In addition, we (Fetterman et al., 2010; Robinson et al., in press) recently suggested that 
the sorts of cognitive processes that give rise to cognitive error are also those that underlie 
diverse manifestations of self-regulation failure. If so, cognitive probes of the present type may 
be of use in predicting individual differences in other realms thought reflect, in part, the 
withdrawal of the self’s controlled resources, such as procrastination (Tice & Baumeister, 1997), 
poorer work performance (Mount, Oh, & Burns, 2008), and addictive behaviors (Muraven, 
Collins, & Neinhaus, 2002). 
In this connection, we do note that basic cognitive tasks, thus far of a reaction time type, 
have predicted outcomes as important as criminality (Jensen, 1998) and life expectancy (Deary 
& Der, 2005). It is arguable that response accuracy, relative to response speed, is an even more 
basic quality of cognition that should have significant implications for everyday life functioning. 
If so, routine cognitive errors, even in mundane cognitive tasks, might have an even wider scope 
of predictive validity than documented in the present studies. 
Routine Cognitive Errors 37 
Conclusions 
We found that individual differences in routine cognitive error frequency exhibited trait-
like properties, both across time and across tasks. Further, individual differences in routine 
cognitive errors were independent of the trait of neuroticism, but nevertheless predicted negative 
emotional experiences, symptoms, and displayed behaviors to a significant extent. Given the 
robust nature of the present findings, more attention should be paid to routine cognitive errors in 
future studies concerned with individual differences in effective social-emotional functioning. 
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